By Qhawe Brian Pittman Bey — Pittman’s Pocket Legal & Sports Review

A Federal College-Sports Law Cannot Substitute for Accountability

The pending Protect College Sports Act of 2026, S. 4668, represents one of the most consequential proposed federal interventions into college athletics in decades. Sponsored by Senator Ted Cruz and Senator Maria Cantwell, the legislation seeks to establish national rules governing NIL, transfers, eligibility, athlete protections, media rights, recruiting, and portions of the relationship between the NCAA, conferences, schools, and athletes.

For independent football professionals, student-athletes, HBCUs, and litigants who have challenged NCAA-related practices, however, a central question remains:

Does federalizing the rules of college athletics actually create accountability, or does it potentially place more authority in the same institutional structure that athletes and independent participants have historically challenged?

That question has particular significance when viewed alongside Qhawe Brian Pittman Bey v. NCAA and Adam Morrissey, Pittman’s litigation concerning NCAA-related recruiting/scouting procedures, alleged restrictions on independent football activity, and asserted due-process and antitrust concerns.

The two matters are not the same legal proceeding. The Protect College Sports Act cannot simply be inserted retroactively into Pittman’s existing case. But the proposed federal framework could substantially change the legal environment surrounding similar conduct going forward.

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I. The Present Status of the Protect College Sports Act

As of September 25, 2026, S. 4668 remains legislation rather than enacted federal law.

The Senate advanced the legislation through several procedural votes. On September 24, the Senate adopted Senator Cruz’s substitute amendment by a vote of 77–23. The Senate’s official schedule states that the chamber is scheduled to vote on passage of S. 4668 on September 28.

Therefore, there are presently three different legal stages that must not be confused:

1. Pending bill — legislation being considered by Congress.
2. Enacted statute — legislation passed by Congress and signed by the President, or otherwise becoming law under the Constitution.
3. Enforced statute — an enacted law being applied to a particular person, school, conference, NCAA entity, or transaction.

That distinction is critical to Pittman’s potential legal strategy.

A person generally cannot bring a constitutional lawsuit merely because Congress has introduced or debated a bill. There ordinarily must be a legally cognizable injury, a defendant against whom relief can be obtained, and a sufficiently concrete dispute.

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II. Comparing the Pittman Litigation With the Proposed Federal Framework

Pittman’s litigation predates the Protect College Sports Act.

The underlying dispute arose from conduct and events occurring years before the present federal legislation. Publicly described materials concerning the case include communications between Pittman and NCAA enforcement personnel regarding an NCAA scouting-service application and terminology concerning NCAA certification/compliance.

Pittman’s appellate history also includes Florida Supreme Court case SC2026-0670 and transfer to the Second District Court of Appeal for appellate review, according to publicly available reporting concerning the proceeding.

The important legal comparison is therefore not:

“Would the Protect College Sports Act automatically make Pittman’s old case valid?”

Rather, the legally meaningful question is:

Would conduct similar to the conduct alleged by Pittman be treated differently if the federal statute becomes law and its operative provisions apply to that conduct?

That distinction is substantial.

The Act would create federal rights and causes of action that did not previously exist in exactly the same form.

For example, the legislation contains provisions creating private rights of action concerning specified student-athlete protections. CBO’s analysis likewise recognizes that S. 4668 would create new private rights of action and whistleblower protections.

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III. The Antitrust Issue Is Particularly Important

One of the most significant changes is the proposed treatment of antitrust law.

CBO explains that S. 4668 would establish limited antitrust exemptions involving certain NIL, eligibility, compensation, and media-rights activities. CBO also states that some federal and state antitrust claims challenging specified conduct would be barred by the proposed exemptions.

This creates an important tension.

On one side, Congress is attempting to provide certainty to college athletics by establishing national rules.

On the other side, an antitrust exemption can reduce the ability of private parties to challenge conduct under traditional antitrust theories.

That matters to the Pittman framework because his litigation has included antitrust-related allegations concerning recruiting and institutional practices.

The legal question would therefore become much more precise:

Is the challenged conduct actually within the statutory exemption, or does it fall outside the conduct Congress chose to immunize?

That distinction could become central in future litigation.

An exemption does not automatically mean that every action by the NCAA, conference, university, coach, scouting service, or recruiting organization becomes immune from judicial review.

The statute’s actual language, definitions, effective dates, exceptions, and enforcement provisions would control.

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IV. The HBCU Football Problem

The most important policy question may be different from the antitrust question:

What happens to HBCU football programs that do not possess the same media, donor, institutional, or governmental resources available to the largest athletic departments?

The Protect College Sports Act contains provisions that could benefit HBCUs.

The legislation proposes $180 million annually for five years through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration for long-term broadband, information-technology, media, live-sports production, transmission, distribution, and local-journalism infrastructure at HBCUs. It also provides for HBCU representation on the proposed Commission on the Future of College Athletics.

Those provisions are significant.

But they do not necessarily solve the entire HBCU football problem.

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V. Infrastructure Is Not the Same as Football Funding

HBCUs require more than broadband.

A competitive football infrastructure can require:

• recruiting departments;
• scouting personnel;
• recruiting databases;
• video technology;
• strength and conditioning;
• sports medicine;
• nutrition;
• player development;
• travel;
• equipment;
• stadium maintenance;
• football operations;
• NIL infrastructure;
• compliance personnel;
• local media;
• professional scouting relationships;
• alumni investment;
• donor support;
• marketing;
• professional development;
• and reliable athletic-department operating revenue.

Federal HBCU funding already exists outside the proposed sports legislation.

The Department of Education reports FY2026 Title III, Part B HBCU funding of approximately $405.8 million, including approximately $399.8 million in continuation funding and $6 million in supplemental funding for junior/community colleges.

The Department of Education also reports approximately $80.2 million in FY2026 Title III, Part F funding.

Those programs are important, but they are primarily institutional and educational funding mechanisms. They are not equivalent to creating a dedicated national HBCU football infrastructure fund.

That distinction should be part of the national discussion.

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VI. The Potential HBCU Disadvantage

The concern is not necessarily that the Protect College Sports Act explicitly discriminates against HBCUs.

The more sophisticated concern is structural neutrality.

A rule can be formally neutral while producing substantially different practical consequences for institutions with radically different financial resources.

For example:

A large athletic department may have a sophisticated compliance office, NIL personnel, recruiting analysts, multimedia staff, attorneys, marketing personnel, and extensive donor support.

An HBCU athletic department may have considerably fewer personnel and resources.

If Congress creates additional compliance obligations, reporting requirements, NIL procedures, recruiting restrictions, medical requirements, media requirements, and financial rules without simultaneously providing sufficient implementation resources, the cost of compliance can itself become an institutional disadvantage.

That is an issue worthy of empirical measurement rather than political speculation.

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VII. The Accountability Question

The proposed Act contains transparency provisions requiring information concerning revenue sharing, revenues, expenditures, athlete participation, and academic outcomes to be disclosed through a public database.

That could create an important accountability mechanism.

But the critical question is:

Who reviews the information, who has enforcement authority, and what remedy exists when the information reveals unequal treatment?

This is where the Pittman litigation provides a useful conceptual case study.

Pittman’s central position has consistently involved the idea that institutional power should not eliminate meaningful review of allegedly improper conduct.

A federal statute should therefore be evaluated not merely by the rights it announces, but by:

1. who can enforce those rights;
2. what evidence can be obtained;
3. what discovery is available;
4. what remedies exist;
5. whether individuals can sue;
6. whether institutions can be held accountable;
7. whether whistleblowers are protected;
8. whether antitrust claims remain available;
9. whether state remedies are preempted; and
10. whether HBCUs have sufficient resources to comply.

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VIII. The Preemption Problem

CBO identifies another major feature of S. 4668: proposed preemption of conflicting state and local laws involving NIL compensation and transfer/eligibility rules.

Federal preemption can create uniformity.

But it can also remove alternative state-law avenues.

That creates an important question for future litigants:

If federal law displaces a state remedy, does the federal statute provide an adequate substitute remedy?

That question becomes particularly significant when Congress simultaneously limits traditional antitrust claims but creates new statutory causes of action.

The result could be a completely different litigation map from the one that existed when Pittman’s original dispute arose.

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IX. How Soon Could Pittman Contest the Act?

The answer depends upon what “contest” means.

A. Before enactment

Pittman can challenge the policy and legislative framework now through:

• congressional correspondence;
• testimony;
• public comments where available;
• communications with senators and representatives;
• HBCU institutional advocacy;
• proposed amendments;
• requests for HBCU-specific funding;
• requests for independent enforcement mechanisms;
• and development of a formal legislative record.

That is not the same thing as filing a constitutional lawsuit.

B. Immediately after enactment

Enactment alone does not necessarily give Pittman standing to sue.

A federal court generally requires an actual case or controversy.

The strongest future plaintiff would ordinarily be someone who can demonstrate:

statute → application/enforcement → concrete injury.

For example:

The statute is enacted → NCAA or another covered entity takes an action against Pittman pursuant to the statute → Pittman suffers a concrete legal injury → Pittman challenges the application of the statute.

That is materially stronger procedurally than:

Congress enacted a statute that I believe is unconstitutional → therefore I sue immediately.

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X. A Potential Constitutional Challenge Framework

If the Act becomes law and Pittman later suffers a concrete injury from its application, a potential federal challenge could be organized around several questions.

COUNT I — Constitutional Authority / Separation of Powers

The challenge would identify the specific statutory provision and ask whether Congress acted within its enumerated constitutional authority.

The Commerce Clause would likely be central because interstate commerce, media rights, NIL transactions, and national college athletics are directly implicated.

The argument would have to attack the specific statutory provision rather than simply the existence of federal regulation of college athletics.

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COUNT II — Due Process

If the statute or its enforcement mechanism deprives a person of a protected liberty or property interest, the challenge could examine:

• notice;
• opportunity to be heard;
• neutral decision-making;
• procedural safeguards;
• available appeals;
• and judicial review.

This is where the principles raised in Pittman’s prior litigation could become relevant conceptually.

But the new statute would have to be challenged based on its own operative provisions and application.

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COUNT III — Equal Protection

A potential equal-protection claim would require identification of a governmental classification and a legally sufficient basis for challenging that classification.

For HBCU-related litigation, the strongest factual record would not simply say:

“HBCUs are disadvantaged.”

It would document measurable disparities, such as:

• per-athlete funding;
• football operating budgets;
• recruiting expenditures;
• media revenue;
• staffing;
• travel budgets;
• facilities;
• compliance costs;
• NIL resources;
• scholarship resources;
• and federal/state support.

That would transform a broad policy argument into an evidentiary record.

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COUNT IV — First Amendment / Petition and Association Rights

If the statute were applied in a way that punished protected speech, advocacy, association, journalism, scouting, whistleblowing, or petitioning activity, a First Amendment theory could potentially arise.

The factual issue would again be crucial.

The claim would need to identify:

protected conduct + governmental restriction + causal connection + injury.

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COUNT V — Administrative-Law Challenge

If federal agencies are given authority to implement the statute, regulations and enforcement decisions could potentially become subject to administrative-law review.

The precise statutory delegation would need to be examined.

A future challenge could therefore distinguish:

Congressional statute

from

agency regulation

from

NCAA enforcement action

from

university implementation.

Those are four different legal acts and potentially four different avenues of judicial review.

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XI. The Most Important New Issue: Antitrust Immunity

For Pittman specifically, the most important provision to study may be the proposed antitrust exemption.

CBO states that S. 4668 would limit antitrust liability for institutions and athletic associations complying with specified statutory rules and would preempt certain state-law challenges.

That means a future complaint should not simply plead:

“The NCAA violated the Sherman Act.”

It would first need to answer:

1. What conduct occurred?
2. When did it occur?
3. Which entity performed it?
4. Which statutory section governs it?
5. Is that conduct covered by an exemption?
6. Does an exception apply?
7. Is the challenged conduct actually required by federal law?
8. Is the defendant acting under federal authority or independently?
9. What private right of action exists?
10. What remedy does Congress authorize?

That would make the pleading substantially more precise.

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XII. Pittman’s Case as a Historical Record

The significance of Qhawe Brian Pittman Bey v. NCAA and Adam Morrissey may ultimately extend beyond the disposition of the individual litigation.

The case presents a historical record of an independent football professional attempting to operate within an NCAA-controlled recruiting environment.

Publicly reported materials concerning the dispute identify communications between Pittman and NCAA personnel concerning the scouting-service application process and the distinction between “NCAA Certified” and “NCAA compliant.”

That history is relevant to a larger policy question:

Should independent scouting, recruiting, media, evaluation, and athlete-development professionals have meaningful avenues to challenge institutional rules that affect their economic participation in college football?

The Protect College Sports Act should be evaluated against that question as well.

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XIII. HBCU Football Needs an Accountability Model, Not Only a Compliance Model

The proposed legislation contains important HBCU infrastructure provisions.

But HBCU football requires a broader model.

A meaningful federal HBCU football framework could include:

1. HBCU Football Infrastructure Fund

Dedicated federal funding for:

• football facilities;
• recruiting technology;
• athletic training;
• sports medicine;
• nutrition;
• video departments;
• scouting;
• media production;
• and player development.

2. HBCU Recruiting Technology Initiative

Provide HBCUs with standardized access to modern recruiting and athlete-evaluation technology.

3. Independent HBCU Football Accountability Office

An independent body could collect financial and competitive data and investigate complaints concerning:

• recruiting;
• NIL;
• media access;
• scheduling;
• athlete treatment;
• and institutional compliance.

4. HBCU Media Equity Requirement

If national media-rights systems generate enormous value from college football, HBCUs should have measurable access to media distribution rather than relying exclusively on local markets.

5. Public Football Financial Reporting

Every Division I institution could report football-specific:

• revenue;
• expenses;
• recruiting expenditure;
• staffing;
• facility investment;
• media revenue;
• NIL spending;
• and institutional subsidy.

6. Independent Scouting and Recruiting Protections

Federal law could recognize legitimate independent scouting and athlete-evaluation organizations while maintaining reasonable compliance standards.

7. HBCU Infrastructure Matching Grants

Federal funds could match state, private, alumni, and corporate contributions for HBCU football infrastructure.

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XIV. The Central Legal Argument

The strongest future argument is therefore not:

“The Protect College Sports Act is automatically unconstitutional.”

The stronger argument would be:

A federal regulatory structure governing college athletics must provide meaningful rights, remedies, transparency, and institutional accountability while avoiding a system in which increased federal regulation protects large athletic institutions without providing comparable resources and enforcement mechanisms to HBCUs and independent participants.

That is a legal and policy proposition that can be tested against the actual statutory text.

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XV. Conclusion

The Protect College Sports Act is attempting to solve a genuine national legal problem: college athletics has become increasingly governed by overlapping NCAA rules, conference rules, state laws, federal litigation, NIL agreements, transfer rules, media contracts, and court settlements.

The Act would create national standards and new athlete protections.

It would also create new limits on antitrust litigation and preempt certain state-law rules. CBO specifically recognizes that the proposed legislation could both create new federal causes of action and restrict certain existing antitrust claims.

For HBCUs, the proposed $180 million annual HBCU media and technology infrastructure program is potentially significant.

But broadband and media infrastructure alone do not resolve the broader football-resource gap.

The central issue should therefore be accountability plus resources.

HBCU football cannot be protected simply by placing HBCUs under the same regulatory structure as institutions possessing vastly different financial and media resources.

And athletes and independent football professionals cannot be protected merely by announcing rights without providing meaningful mechanisms to enforce them.

For Pittman, the next legal question is consequently not whether his earlier litigation can simply be rewritten under a future statute. It cannot be assumed that way.

The more precise question is whether the federal framework creates new rights, new restrictions, new exemptions, and new causes of action that can be challenged when they are actually applied.

If S. 4668 becomes law, the first task should be to obtain the final enacted statutory text, identify its effective dates and transitional provisions, map every provision affecting antitrust and private rights of action, and then determine whether any concrete action against Pittman or an HBCU creates an appropriate federal case or controversy.

That would turn the discussion from a general objection to a statute into a specific, legally reviewable claim.

The future of HBCU football should not be measured only by whether HBCUs are permitted to participate. It should be measured by whether they possess the resources, representation, transparency, technology, economic opportunity, and legal remedies necessary to compete within the system.